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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated, §78-2a-3(2)(h), and the provisions of Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Whether the trial court correctly allowed Appellee (hereinafter "Mother") to
relocate to Nevada with her children when Mother had physical custody of the children
and the Appellant (hereinafter "Father") has not sought to change this custodial
arrangement.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Questions of law and constitutionality are reviewed for correctness. Salt Lake
City v. Lopez. 935 P.2d 1259, 1262 (Utah App. 1997) (citations omitted).
If this Court determines that the action at the lower court amounts to a petition to
modify custody on behalf of the Father, the trial court's decision to maintain the custodial
relationship with the Mother will be reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard.
Larson v. Larson. 888 P.2d 719, 722 (Utah App. 1994) (citing Crouse v. Crouse. 817
P.2d 836, 838 (Utah App. 1991)). In Larson this Court clarified the standard required to
change custody on the basis of a relocation by stating that "unless there were compelling
evidence that residing in Summit County, Utah, would be better for the children than
allowing them to continue to reside with their life-long primary caregiver [the relocating
parent], we would conclude that the trial court exceeded the exercise of sound discretion
1

in entering the order before us." LdL at 723 (reversing the trial court's order changing the
custodial relationship if the primary caregiver relocated out of Summit County).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
There are no statutes or provisions which are wholly dispositive of the issues
presented in this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

This appeal is from a final order of the Third Judicial District Court in and for
Summit County, State of Utah. In particular, Father has appealed the lower court's order
denying Father's request that Mother be restrained from relocating to Nevada.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW

This matter came before the lower on Mother's Verified Motion for Approval to
Relocate which was filed on or about October 11, 1999. Father then filed a Motion on
Temporary Issues on or about November 10, 1999, in part requesting that Mother's
request to relocate be denied. Both parties filed supporting pleadings and documentation
and the matter originally came before the lower court on November 17, 1999.
At this hearing, the lower court stated that Mother's relocation was appropriate
and should be permitted during the 1999/2000 Christmas Holiday. In addition, the lower
court granted Father's request that the matter be reviewed by the custody evaluator, and
that the matter be set for further hearing.

2

The matter came on for further hearing on December 22, 1999, and upon hearing
arguments and proffers of counsel, the lower court granted Mother's request to relocate to
Las Vegas with the children, and, specifically, ordered that the relocation take place on or
after July 1, 2000, to allow the children to complete their school year, to facilitate
therapy, and allow Father to improve his relationship with Sebastian.
Father filed his Notice of Appeal of this Order on or about February 18, 2000.
C.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

The parties were divorced by a Decree of Divorce dated February 18, 1997. (R.
1910-1920). The Decree stemmed from a trial setting on January 27, 1997. (R. 1910).
At that time, the parties, with the encouragement of Judge Pat B. Brian, negotiated a
settlement of the issues attendant to the marital estate and custody of their children. (R.
1910-1920). The settlement was reached over many hours with the input and
recommendations of Judge Brian. (R. 1910-1920).
The parties have two children, Kelsey, whose date of birth is January 22, 1987,
and who is now 13 years of age, and Sebastian, whose date of birth is October 23, 1984,
and who is 15 years of age. (R. 2). The parties had previously separated in January of
1995 and, originally, the Mother had custody of both children on a temporary basis. (R.
2274). The Decree, however, awarded physical custody of Kelsey to Mother and
physical custody of Sebastian to Father and joint legal custody to both parents. (R. 19101920).
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At the time of the settlement, Mother expressed to the court and Father her desire
to move from the Salt Lake area and return to Nevada. (R. 2274). Father expressed his
desire that this not occur. (R. 2274). After substantial discussion with the lower court,
the court suggested what was thought to be a reasonable resolution and that became the
stipulation and order of the court. (R. 1910-1920). That language is contained in
paragraph 5 of the Decree and that language is as follows:
"Both plaintiff and defendant are enjoined from moving out of the Salt Lake
County, Utah or Summit County, Utah for the next sixteen (16) months in
order to facilitate a continuation of visitation as hereinafter set out. Should
either party desire to move from the designated geographical area after
sixteen (16) months, the party desiring to move shall file a motion and place
it on the court's law and motion calendar, requesting that the move be
approved by the court and specifying the reasons why the party desires to
make the move. If the request is opposed by the other party, the court will
hear the motion. The court has indicated it will be inclined to grant the
motion if there is any good reason for the move. At the time of hearing, the
court shall determine whether to grant the move or whether any further
evaluation or information is needed. In order to implement this provision,
the Honorable Pat B. Brian shall retain jurisdiction over the case as to any
motion involving a requested move." (R. 1911) (emphasis added).
During a substantial portion of the parties' marriage and relationship, they resided
in Las Vegas, Nevada, and, indeed, at the date of divorce the parties still owned a
residence together in Las Vegas. (R. 2275). The Father currently owns a business and
real estate in Las Vegas. (R. 2275). Mother owns real estate in Las Vegas. (R. 2275).
Mother's family continues to reside in Las Vegas, though Mother's father recently passed
away. (R. 2275).
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Mother filed a Petition for Modification of the Decree of Divorce on or about
September 1, 1999, within which petition she requested physical custody of Sebastian.
(R. 2099-2104). Sebastian had been residing in Mother's home since, approximately,
August 23, 1999. (R. 2100). The move to Mother's home occurred after an altercation
between Father and Sebastian as a result of which Father kicked Sebastian down a set of
stairs and continued to kick him the buttocks and stomach until he kicked him out of the
house. (R. 2276, Update Evaluation, Aplt. Apndx. pg. 4). There were bruises on the
child and an 8 centimeter skin abrasion on his right knee and photographs were taken by
DCFS. (R. 2276). Mother was advised by the DCFS worker at that time that there
should be no visitation between Father and Sebastian. (R. 2276). Sebastian has shown
no interest in visiting with his Father, and is not visiting with his Father. (R. 2276).
Mother has acknowledged that Sebastian requires substantial time commitment
and supervision. (R. 2276). Sebastian has been volatile and has acted out physically. (R.
2276). Mother has refused to engage the child physically. (R. 2276). Unfortunately,
Father has historically disciplined the child by physically grabbing his hair and neck and
throwing him against the walls and onto the ground. (R. 2276, Update Evaluation, Aplt.
Apndx. pg. 4). Sebastian's earlier residence with Father was due to the need to keep the
children separate because of an abuse incident between the children, Sebastian and
Kelsey, approximately three and one-half years ago. (R. 2276). Since that time, both
children have matured, and Sebastian, who has been under the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court, has received treatment for his behavioral problems and Mother has taken
5

appropriate steps to provide appropriate structure for Sebastian and appropriate structure
and protection for Kelsey. (R. 2276-2277). The children's relationship is very good and
the relationship continues to be consistently monitored by Mother. (R. 2277). It is
important to note that Mother will have extended family available in Las Vegas to assist
her in this supervision. (R. 2277, Update Evaluation, Aplt. Apndx. pg. 4). There is no
extended family on either side in Salt Lake City. (R. 2277, R. 2270 Transcript pg. 8-9).
Mother filed a Verified Motion for Approval to Relocate on or about October 12,
1999. (R. 2107-2123). Mother set forth in that motion that she desired to move to Las
Vegas because she had lived there for 18 years and for the reasons that her parents, two
sisters, brother-in-law and nephew resided in Las Vegas. (R. 2108-2109, Update
Evaluation, Aplt. Apndx. pg. 4). Her father has since passed away but was also Mother's
intention to reside close to her mother and sister. (R. 2108). Within the motion, Mother
also indicated that she could receive a higher paying salary in Las Vegas. (R. 2109). She
had also commenced a business in Las Vegas with her sister, Sonja, which involves real
estate investment and sale. (R. 2109, Update Evaluation, Aplt. Apndx. pg. 4). This
business can be performed substantially at home to allow greater flexibility of lime with
the children. (R. 2277). Indeed, subsequent to the lower court's orders in regard to the
relocation having been entered, Mother terminated her employment in as a nurse
anticipation of new employment in Las Vegas, sold her residence, and moved to Las
Vegas. (R. 2277-2278).
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Father continues to operate his business, CB Display as a business in Las Vegas,
and owns real property in Las Vegas. (R. 2278). The proximity of Las Vegas to Salt
Lake is reasonable. The flight time is, approximately, 1 hour. (R. 2278, R. 2270
Transcript pg. 14). Further, Father's income is substantial as he had earned $16,250.00
per month at the time of the Decree. (R. 2132). This makes ease of travel somewhat less
onerous.
Father has historically not exercised mid-week or "surprise visits" with the
children and the parties have resided some distance from one another for several years.
Mother has resided in Holladay and Father in Woodland, Utah. (R. 2278, R. 2270
Transcript pg. 14, lines 9-17). On this issue, the evidence before the trial court was that
"[t]here is no spontaneity of contact. . . Mr. Birsa has not taken the opportunities,
although offered, to pick up the children for lunch or to pick up the children and take
them to gymnastics or do any of those things that he could. He's simply not done it.
He's done the standard visitation. That's all he's done." (R. 2270 Transcript pg. 14,
lines 9-17). There have not been "spontaneous" visits by Father with Kelsey and there
are currently no visits occurring between Sebastian and Father. (R. 2278).
Sebastian has not been thriving in his educational process and so a change or move
from one school to another is likely to not have substantial impact. (R. 2278, R. 2270
Transcript pg. 30-31). Also, Kelsey has had to change schools, in any event, after the
end of the 1999/2000 school year, due to the fact that her junior high closed at the end of
this school year and the children were divided between other schools. (R. 2278, R. 2270
7

Transcript pg. 11). Therefore, she was faced with the disruption of a change in school
and classmates in any event. (R. 2278). The lower court carefully weighed the effects of
the relocation on the best interests of the children and the timing of such a relocation and
specifically stated that the July 1 move "would give the children the summer to make
some friends, find out where the school is, do what needs to be done for another move in
their lives. It may provide some meaningful help to this very troubled 15-year-old-boy."
(R. 2270 Transcript pg. 39). The trial court also reiterated Jill Sanders reasoning why the
relocation should take place on July 1, stating that "I believe that she's right on." (R.
2270 Transcript pg. 39).
Both children very much want to reside with Mother. (R. 2279, Update
Evaluation, Aplt. Apndx. pg. 3). Kelsey has resided in Mother's custody since the
parties' separation. (R. 2270 Transcript pg. 16, 18). Father has offered to take back
custody of Sebastian, but he has indicated twice in open court that if he does, the child
will not live with him and suggested that the child would be placed in a military school in
Colorado. (R. 2279, R. 2270 Transcript pg. 14, 31). This is an even greater distance
from Woodland, Utah and makes for even greater difficulty in repairing the damage
between Sebastian and Father than the child's residence in Las Vegas with Mother and
sister. (R. 2279). Both children are comfortable with and supportive of the move. (R.
2279, Custody Evaluation, Aplt. Apndx. pg. 3).
Mother's motion for approval to relocate initially came on for hearing on
November 17, 1999 before Judge Brian. (R. 2215). At that time, after argument, the
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lower court issued an order indicating its intention that Mother be permitted to move at
the Christmas holidays, but that Father could have the matter reviewed by Dr. Jill
Sanders, the custody evaluator, and that upon the receipt of that report, the court would
address the issue further. (R. 2240-2243).
Dr. Sanders was the original custody evaluator. (R. 2279). She met with the
children and the parties and issued her recommendations. (R. 2279). Her primary
recommendation was that Mother not be permitted to relocate. (Update Evaluation, Aplt.
Apndx. pg. 4). Counsel for Mother had previously informed the lower court at the date
of the hearing on November 17, 1999 that it was counsel's belief that Dr. Sanders would,
indeed, recommend that the move not occur. (R. 2279-2280). Dr. Sanders is typically
opposed to custodial parents relocating and has openly expressed this opinion in this case,
other cases, and in seminars; including one very recent seminar hosted by counsel for
Father.1 (R. 2280). Dr. Sanders recommended, however, that if the lower court did
allow Mother to relocate that it should occur at the end of the current school year.
(Update Evaluation, Aplt. Apndx. pg. 5). Dr. Sanders did not recommend that Father be
awarded custody of either child. (Update Evaluation, Aplt. Apndx.). Dr. Sanders did not
recommend that Sebastian be sent to military school in Colorado. (Update Evaluation,
Aplt. Apndx.). No petition is pending requesting custody of the children by Respondent.

1

E>r. Sanders spoke December 4, 1999 in Salt Lake City a seminar sponsored by the
American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers and hosted by Mr. Dolowitz at which time she
opined she was generally not in favor of relocation for custodial parents.
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After receipt of Dr. Sanders' report, this matter was heard by Judge Brian on
December 22, 1999 and at that time the lower court heard the proffers and arguments of
counsel and reviewed the law and entered an order. (R. 2244, R. 2250-2252, Transcript
at R. 2270). The lower court specifically ordered that the Mother's motion to relocate be
granted, but that it should take place July 1 or later to allow for completion of the school
year, therapeutic treatment of Sebastian and the healing process between Father and
Sebastian. (R. 2250-2251). Sebastian has been in therapy with Barbara Dobbs. (R.
2280). There continues to be no visitation being exercised between Father and Sebastian,
though the child was asked by Father to accompany him on a two week European
vacation in June. (R. 2280).
Father previously filed a motion to prevent the relocation and for a stay of the trial
court's order which proceeded to hearing on April 21, 2000 before the Honorable Robert
Hilder. (R. 2263-2265). Judge Hilder denied the motion. (Minute Entry dated
4/21/2000, Volume 6 of Record, not numbered). Father filed a motion with this Court to
prevent relocation and for a stay of the lower court's order and this motion was argued
and denied on May 17, 2000.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The lower court's denial of the Father's request to restrain the Mother from
relocating to Nevada was appropriate in this action. The Father has not petitioned for a
change of custody. The Father did not request custody at the lower level and did not
offer any evidence as to whether a change in custody would be in the children's best
10

interests. The decree of divorce contemplated a relocation and the lower court
established how and when such a relocation could occur. The Mother complied with
these requirements. The updated evaluation, while primarily recommending against
relocation, also clearly established that it would be against the best interests of the
children to disrupt the custodial relationship between Mother and the children.
In this case, the Father, while failing to request a change in custody, also failed to
establish any of the necessary legal requirements to even allow the lower court to
consider such a change in custody. To be able to modify a physical custodial
relationship, the lower court must establish that since the time of the previous decree,
circumstances upon the which the earlier award was based have changed; and these
changed circumstances are sufficiently substantial and material to justify reopening the
question of custody. Only after such a finding, the lower court must then determine that
the change in custody is in the children's best interests. These required findings were
neither made by the lower court, nor were they supported by any of the evidence. This
being the case, the lower court correctly maintained the custodial relationship.
Furthermore, if Father's argument is interpreted to state that, the trial court could
modify the previous order to restrain Mother from ever relocating as long as the children
were minors, such a determination would violate a number of Mother's constitutional
rights under both the Utah Constitution and the Constitution of the United States of
America. In effect, Father would be requesting that this Court simply change physical
custody based only on the Mother's relocation and thereby ignore the children's best
11

interests all together or unilaterally restrain Mother and the children from ever relocating
in violation of their constitutional rights to travel and associate.

ARGUMENT
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY DENIED FATHER'S REQUEST TO
RESTRAIN MOTHER FROM RELOCATING TO NEVADA.
I.

THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
DENYING FATHER'S REQUEST TO RESTRAIN MOTHER FROM
RELOCATING TO NEVADA.
A.

FATHER'S FAILURE TO MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE.

Father acknowledges that "[w]hen attacking the exercise of discretion by a trial
court, it is the responsibility of Appellant to search the record and marshal the evidence
that supports the decision of the trial court." (Aplt. Brf. pg 15); See Bailey-Allen Co..
Inc. v. Kurzet 945 P.2d 180, 186 (Utah. App. 1/97) (holding that an appellant must first
marshall all of the evidence supporting the lower court's findings, and then demonstrate
that, even if viewed in a light most favorable to the trial court, the evidence is legally
insufficient to support the findings). Rather than following this rule, Father simply states
that "[i]n this case, there is none. The only evidence of the best interests of the children
that has been presented to the trial court is the bare assertion to that effect in the motion
of the Appellee." (Aplt. Brf. pg. 15).
However, the lower court clearly stated in its order that it based it's order on the
entire file, pleadings, Dr. Sanders report, the arguments and proffers of counsel. Some of
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the facts which should have been marshaled by Father which were included as the basis
for the lower court's order include:
1.

Mother had physical custody of both of the children. Father has not

requested physical custody of the children. In fact, Father has stated at least twice in
open court that if he had physical custody of Sebastian, he would send him to military
school in Colorado.
2.

As found by Dr. Sanders, both children "have expressed a desire to

continue their primary residence with [Mother]". Dr. Sanders also found this to be
"logical outcome" for Kelsey based upon her historical custodial relationship with
Mother, Kelsey's "strong attachment to her mother," and gender and developmental
issues.
3.

As found by Dr. Sanders, Father voluntarily relinquished physical custody

of Sebastian to Mother in August of 1999. Sebastian has refused to participate in
visitation with Father. As found by Dr. Sanders, this rift was a result of physical abuse to
Sebastian by Father.
4.

As found by Dr. Sanders and stated by Mother, Mother's desire to relocate

was based upon many reasons including a desire to live closer to her extended family in
Nevada, including her recently widowed mother. Neither party has extended family in
Utah. Such access to extended family will be a positive influence for the children. In
addition, Mother has embarked on a real estate venture in Las Vegas which has become
difficult to manage from Utah and requires her ongoing attention. By improving her
13

business and finances, Mother will be more able to provide emotional and financial
support for the children.
5.

Although Dr. Sanders did recommend that her first choice was that Mother

not be allowed to relocate, Dr. Sanders then spent over one quarter of her report
recommending the timing and possible visitation once the relocation is granted. Dr.
Sanders did not recommend that Father be awarded custody. This clearly evidences Dr.
Sanders' acknowledgment that the custodial relationship between Mother and the
children should not be disrupted regardless of the relocation.
Dr. Sanders clearly did not address the legal issues attendant to this case, and
based her report solely on interviews with the parties, the children, and her personal
opinions and biases. "[T]he trial court is free to accept or reject an expert's testimony,
and may accord it whatever weight it deems appropriate in light of all the other evidence
in the case." Myers v. Myers. 768 P.2d 979, 984 (Utah App. 1989) (citing State v.
Skickles. 760 P.2d 291, 302 (Utah 1988); Pukey v. Pukey. 728 P.2d 117, 120 (Utah
1986)). Based upon all of the information available to the lower court and the lower
court's familiarity with the parties and the case in general and the legal issues, the lower
court did not abuse its discretion in providing different weight to the different
recommendations of Dr. Sander's report.
None of these facts which provided the basis of the lower court's order were
marshaled by Father. When these facts are viewed in a light most favorable to the lower
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court, it is obvious that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Father's
request to restrain Mother from relocating to Nevada.
B.

THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
DENYING FATHER'S REQUEST TO RESTRAIN MOTHER FROM
RELOCATING TO NEVADA.

Father relies on this Court's decisions in Myers v. Myers and Larson v. Larson to
support his contention that even in light of all of the evidence supporting Mother's
relocation with the children, the trial court abused its discretion in denying Father's
request to restrain Mother from relocating. Father states that "[i]n Myers, this court
determined that the trial court must have found that it was in the children's best interest to
relocate." (Aplt. Brf. pg. 15). However, in Myers, the trial court allowed a relocation of
a custodial parent, even though the trial court did not specifically find that the relocation
was in the children's best interests, and this Court affirmed. 768 P.2d 979, 983-84 (Utah
App. 1989).
In Myers, the trial court did find that the relocating parent was the primary care
giver, she had remarried and appropriately filed a motion to relocate based upon her
husband's employment, that the custody evaluator supported continuing the custodial
relationship based upon the non-custodial parent's conduct, the trauma involved in
changing custody, and the bond between the custodial parent and the children. Id.
Although the trial court did not specifically find the relocation to be in the children's best
interest, this Court stated that "it is reasonable to infer that the court's determination of
the children's best interests included consideration of this move." 14. at 984.
15

In the Myers case, the non-custodial parent had petitioned to modify the
custodial arrangement and was seeking physical custody of the children. In addition, in
Myers, the decree awarded custody to the mother, so long as remained in or within fifty
miles of Salt Lake County. In the present case, Father has not requested physical custody
of the children. Dr. Sanders never recommended any change in custody, and in fact
specifically stated her recommendations for the timing of the relocation and the specifics
of visitation after the relocation. It is also interesting to note that Dr. Sanders also opined
that if the lower court pennitted the move, then Mother should be responsible for any and
all costs of transportation for visitation. (See Aplt. Apndx. Second Update pg. 6).
Further, in this case, unlike Myers, at the time of the decree, the issue of relocation
was specifically addressed. This decree specifically addressed the issue of relocation as
follows:
"Both plaintiff and defendant are enjoined from moving out of the Salt Lake
County, Utah or Summit County, Utah for the next sixteen (16) months in
order to facilitate a continuation of visitation as hereinafter set out. Should
either party desire to move from the designated geographical area after
sixteen (16) months, the party desiring to move shall file a motion and place
it on the court's law and motion calendar, requesting that the move be
approved by the court and specifying the reasons why the party desires to
make the move. If the request is opposed by the other party, the court will
hear the motion. The court has indicated it will be inclined to grant the
motion if there is any good reason for the move. At the time of hearing, the
court shall determine whether to grant the move or whether any further
evaluation or information is needed. In order to implement this provision,
the Honorable Pat B. Brian shall retain jurisdiction over the case as to any
motion involving a requested move." (emphasis added).
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Each of the conditions precedent in the decree took place in this matter. The initial
sixteen months had passed, a motion for relocation was filed, and a further evaluation
was performed.
As in Myers, in the present case, the relocating parent, Mother, is the physical
custodial parent. Her motion to relocate was based upon her desire to facilitate her
business opportunities, and to be close to her recently widowed mother and other
extended family. The lower court relied on Dr. Sander's report, as well as all of the other
evidence showing the strength of the bond between the children and Mother, the physical
abuse of Sebastian by Father, and the importance of maintaining the custodial
relationship between the children and Mother. From all of this evidence, and in light of
the differences between Myers and the present case (Father has not requested custody and
the decree favorably addressed the issue of relocation), even where the lower court did
not specifically state that the relocation was in the children's best interest, it is reasonable
to infer that the court's determination of the children's best interests included
consideration of this move.
The lower court was aware that Mother intended to move, she had sold her
residence in Utah, quit her employment, and her business interests in Nevada required a
greater physical presence in Nevada. Father acknowledges in his Brief (pg. 16) that
Mother has a constitutional right to travel2 (addressed further below) and that "the court

2

Along with constitutional rights to personhood, privacy, autonomy, home and
community, right to association that includes family and marriage. See Relocation Standards
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has the power to say she may [relocate] but the children may not be relocated as that is
contrary to their best interests."3 This argument, however, is illogical as it would require
that Father be awarded physical custody, or that the State of Utah be awarded
guardianship. In light of all of the unrebutted evidence from the pleadings and Dr.
Sanders' report, it is clear that the children's best interests were best served by
maintaining the custodial relationship with Mother, rather than putting them in foster care
in Utah or awarding Father physical custody which would disrupt the custodial
relationship with Mother and the children which is contrary to the children's wishes and
Dr. Sanders' evaluation. A change in custody would also force Sebastian to live with his
Father who has undisputedly physically abused him at least twice, and allow Father to
unilaterally move Sebastian out to Colorado to military school regardless of the child's
best interests.

and Constitutional Considerations. Journal of the American Academy of Matrimonial
Lawyers, Vol. 15, 229, 237, 1998, Comment.
3

This argument that the lower court can simply change custody if Mother chooses to
relocate is contrary to the Utah Supreme Court's holding in Hogge v. Hogge. 649 P.2d 51
(Utah 1982) which established the two-step test to determine whether or not a change in
custody is warranted prior to determining the question of what is in the children's best
interests. Hogge holds that prior to a determination of best interests, the lower court must
establish that" (1) since the time of the previous decree, circumstances upon the which the
earlier award was based have changed; and (2) these changed circumstances are sufficiently
substantial and material to justify reopening the question of custody." Id, at 54. Only after
such a finding, the lower court must then determine that the change in custody is in the
children's best interests, again a finding which the lower court and Dr. Sanders did not make.
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As with the case of Myers, in Larson, the non-custodial parent petitioned to
modify the physical custody order. 888 P.2d 719 (Utah App. 1994). This petition was
premised by the custodial parent's intention to move to Oregon to live with her fiance.
WL at 721. The non-custodial parent stated that the relocation would interfere with his
relationship with the children, disrupt their religious training, and remove them from their
friends and relatives. Id The trial court did not award custody to the non-custodial
parent, but ordered that if the custodial parent moved from Summit County, physical
custody would be transferred as it was in the children's best interests to remain in the
Park City area. IdL
On appeal, this Court determined that the lower court's order could only be
interpreted as meaning that "the children's domicile in Summit County is so essential to
their well-being that removal from that community would be more detrimental to them
than separating them from their custodial parent- the person who has been primarily
responsible for their day-to-day care for the entirety of their lives." Id at 722. This
Court went on to state that "[w]hile such a conclusion is not inherently impossible, a
factor of considerable importance in determining the best interest of children is the
maintenance of continuity in their lives, and removing children from their existing
custodial placement undercuts that policy." 14. at 722-23 (citations omitted). This Court
determined that the lower court erred in modifying the custodial relationship if the
custodial parent ever moved from Summit County. H at 727.
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The lower court in the present case was faced with a similar issue. Contrary to the
Larson case, in the present case at the trial level, Father did not request custody of the
children and simply requested that Mother be restrained from moving. For the first time
now at the appellate level, Father has argued in his Brief that Mother could move, but the
trial court should then simply transfer custody to him, regardless of the two-step Hogge
test and the children's best interests irrespective of the fact that he has filed no petition or
motion for custody. (See Note 3 above). In light of the facts of this case, the lower court
herein did not abuse its discretion in maintaining the very important continuity of the
custodial relationship between the children and Mother. See Larson. 888 P.2d at 722, 23;
Hirsch v. Hirsch. 725 P.2d 1320, 1323 (Utah 1986) (Zimmerman, J. Concurring);
Hutchison v. Hutchison. 649 P.2d 38, 41 (Utah 1982); Nielsen v. Nielsen. 620 P.2d 511,
512 (Utah 1980); In re Cooper. 410 P.2d 475, 476 (Utah 1966); In re Application of
Conde. 347 P.2d 859, 861 (Utah 1959); Rosendahl v. RosendahL 876 P.2d 870, 873
(Utah App.) cert denied, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994); Cummings v. Cummings. 821 P.2d
472, 478-79 (Utah App. 1991); Moon v. Moon. 790 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah App. 1990).
A similar case, with similar reasoning to the Larson decision, is In Re: Marriage of
Burgess. 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996). In Burgess, the court overruled the California Court
of Appeals decision that the relocating parent had the burden of establishing the
"necessity" of the relocation. 14. at 479. The Supreme Court of California declined to
impose a burden on a relocating parent to establish the necessity for the move and
reiterated the paramount importance of continuity of custody over continuity of location
20

and made note that in a "move away" case, a change of custody is not justified simply
because the custodial parent has chosen to reside in a different location. Id at 484. The
court cited statistics that 20% of Americans change residences each year, usually for
economic or marital reasons. Id at 480. In addition, the court, in discussing custody and
relocation, noted that "relocating frequently has little, if any, substantive bearing on the
suitability of a parent to retain the role of a custodial parent. A parent who has been the
primaiy caregiver for minor children is ordinarily no less capable of maintaining the
responsibilities and obligations of parenting simply by virtue of a reasonable decision to
change his or her geographic location." i d at 481.
In addition to the Myers and Larson cases discussed above, Father relies on two
articles to support his contention that the lower court abused its discretion by maintaining
the custodial relationship and allowing Mother's relocation to Nevada. The first article
cited by Father is "A Children's Rights Approach to Relocation: A Meaningful Best
Interests Standard" by Gary A. Debele. Journal of the American Academy of
Matrimonial Lawyers. Vol. 15, 1998, pp. 75-118. Mr. Debele's article is specifically
concerned with the issue of the child's rights during a relocation proceeding. Mr. Debele
states that "[t]he best interests of the child cannot be effected without a consideration of
the child's feelings." I i at 106. As applied to the facts of the present case, Dr. Sanders
found that the children both expressed their desire to continue to reside with Mother and
had a strong attachment to Mother, and Kelsey "cited a number of positive factors
associated with the move."
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Mr. Debele goes on to state that "[w]hen courts intervene in ways that disrupt the
child's relationship with the custodial parent, serious psychological harm may occur to
the child as well as to the parent." Id at 108. As applied to the facts of this case, the
lower court's action herein maintained and supported the children's relationship with the
custodial parent, Mother. In addition, Mr. Debele also cites psychological studies and
articles which state that:
"The cumulative body of social science research on custody does not
support the presumption that frequent and continuing access to both parents
lies at the core of the child's best interests. While the psychological
adjustment of the custodial parent has consistently been found to be related
to the child's adjustment, that of the non-custodial parent has not. Neither
is the amount of visiting of the non-custodial parent consistently related to
the child's adjustment. There is no evidence that frequency of visiting or
amount of time spent with the non-custodial parent over the child's entire
growing up years is significantly related to good outcome in the child or
adolescent. Rather, research indicates that it is the substance and character
of the parent/child relationship, and not the particular form, that is critical."
H at 109.

In further discussing the psychological effects a relocation can have on the children and
parents, Mr. Debele states that "[prohibiting a move by the custodial parent may force
that parent to choose between custody of his or her child and opportunities that may
benefit the family unit. Imposing this choice . . . has the potential of burdening the
parent/child relationship for many years . . . [t]he child's knowledge that he or she has
been the cause of the parent's profound disappointment and losing a central goal in life
can be a terrible burden for the child to bear." Id, at 110.
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The second article cited by Father is 'The Psychological Effects of Relocation for
Children of Divorce," by Marion G. Gindes, Ph. D. Journal of the American Academy of
Matrimonial Lawyers, Vol. 15, 1998, pp. 119-148). Dr. Gindes discusses the impact on
children and parents during a post-divorce relocation of the custodial parent. While Dr.
Gindes does discuss the possibility of stress and trauma caused by a relocation, Dr.
Gindes agrees with Mr. Debele and acknowledges that the factors which have been
consistently related to positive child adjustment are (1) positive custodial parent
adjustment, (2) positive relationship between custodial parent and child, and (3) low level
of conflict between parents. Id at 144-45. Dr. Gindes also acknowledges the studies that
show that "[frequency of contact with the noncustodial parent does not seem to be
related to child well-being but the nature of the contact does." Id at 145. As applied to
the facts of the present case, the trial court's order denying Father's request to restrain
Mother from relocating will promote the custodial relationship between Mother and the
children and lower the level of conflict between the parents.
Based upon the enormous body of case law and the psychological studies as
applied to the evidence and facts of this case, maintaining the custodial relationship
between Mother and the children is the most important factor in determining what is in
the best interests of these children and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Father's request to restrain Mother from moving to Nevada.
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II.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT IT DID NOT
HAVE THE POWER TO PREVENT RELOCATION OR MODIFY
CUSTODY UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE.

Father argues that under the Myers and Larson rulings of this Court, the trial court
had the power to prohibit the relocation of Mother. Father bases this interpretation of
these decisions on the fact that in each case this Court addressed the best interests of the
children prior to affirming the lower court in allowing relocation, and overruling the
lower court where it conditioned a relocation on a change in custody. Specifically, Father
argues that "[i]f no power to permit evaluation of a relocation decision existed, there
would have been no need for this section of the opinion," referring to the section of the
opinion which discussed the best interests of the children. (Aplt. Brf. pg 14). However,
in each of these cases, there was a petition to modify custody in addition to the relocation
issues. When faced with a request for a modification of physical custody, it is black
letter law4 that the trial court must make a determination of what is in the best interests of
the children. At the trial level herein, Father did not seek custody of the children, only
restraint of Mother from relocating.
Father also cites Section 30-3-10.4(l)(b) of the Utah Code to support his allegation
that the trial court could have prevented Mother's relocation. However, the provision
Father cites to states in relevant part:

4

Section 30-3-10 of the Utah Code states that "[i]n determining custody, the court
shall consider the best interests of the child and the past conduct and demonstrated moral
standards of each of the parties."
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"On the motion of one or both of the joint legal custodians the court may,
after a hearing, modify an order establishing joint legal custody i f . . . a
modification of the terms and conditions of the decree would be an
improvement for and in the best interest of the child." (emphasis added).
However, the issue here is relocation. This appeal is not concerned with the modification
of the joint legal custody order. This argument is nonsensical.
Father also cites Section 30-3-5(3) of the Utah Code to support his position that
the trial court could have prevented Mother's relocation. However, this provision states,
in its entirety:
"The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new
orders for the custody of the children and their support, maintenance,
health, and dental care, and distribution of the property and obligations for
debts as is reasonable and necessary." (emphasis added).
Again, here the issue is relocation, not custody. Mother does not dispute that the trial
court has continuing jurisdiction to modify custody, but only after the two-part Hogge test
is established,5 and then only after the determination that the change in custody is in the
children's best interests, a finding which the neither the lower court nor Dr. Sanders
made. Father's attempt to circumvent the statutory and case law requirements for a
change in physical custody is without merit.
Father is arguing that the trial court had discretion to change custody without a
pending petition to modify custody, or a finding of a substantial and material change in

5

(1) Since the time of the previous decree, circumstances upon the which the earlier
award was based have changed; and (2) these changed circumstances are sufficiently
substantial and material to justify reopening the question of custody. (See Note 3 above).
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circumstances, or a finding that such a custodial change was in the best interests of the
children. This position is in clear violation of the statutory law and the case law of this
Court and the Supreme Court of Utah. Alternatively, Father argues that the trial court
had the discretion to order that Mother never leave the geographic area, or if she does,
she would lose custody of the children, again without any evidence or finding that such a
change was in the children's best interests, again in violation of the statutory law and case
law. While the trial court clearly has continuing jurisdiction to modify custodial
arrangements, such a modification still must comply with the statutory requirements, and
the requirements as stated by the appellate courts of Utah.
Furthermore, if Father's argument is interpreted to state that, under the cited
statutes, the trial court could modify the previous order to restrain Mother from ever
relocating as long as the children were minors, such a determination would violate a
number of Mother's constitutional rights under both the Utah Constitution and the
Constitution of the United States of America.6
While this issue has not yet been addressed in Utah, some other jurisdictions have
addressed the constitutional issues in relocation cases. In New Mexico, the preeminent
case is Jaramillo v. Jaramillo. in which the State Supreme Court of New Mexico stated
that placing a burden on the relocating parent to show that relocation is in the best interest

6

Father seems to acknowledge at least one of Mother's constitutional rights on page
16 of his Brief by stating that she could move and the children could stay, however, this
again would require a change in custody which was neither supported by any evidence at the
lower level, nor did Father even request custody at the lower level.
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of the child impairs the relocating parent's constitutional right to travel. 823 P.2d 299
(N.M. 1991). In that case, the mother had primary physical custody in a joint custody
decree. The court stated that placing the burden on the party seeking to relocate to show
that the relocation is in the best interests of the child unconstitutionally impairs the
relocating parent's right to travel. Id at 305 (citing Shapiro v. Thompson. 394 U.S. 618,
629-31 (1969)7; see also Watt v. Watt. 971 P.2d 608 (Wy. Sup. Ct. 1999) (holding that a
clause automatically transferring custody to the father because the mother wanted to
move from the State was violative of the right to travel)). The court indicated that there
are personal rights which a parent has that protects them from governmental infringement,
which includes the custodial parent's right to have the children move with that parent.
The relocating custodial parent in Jaramillo argued that placing the burden on the
relocating parent to prove that the relocation is in the best interests of the child impairs
the relocating parent's right to travel. Id at 304. The Supreme Court of New Mexico
agreed and remanded the case to the trial court to reinstate its order allowing the custodial
parent to relocate with the child.
In the Watt case cited above, the mother was awarded the primary physical
custody of the parties' minor children by the decree, which also allowed for the automatic

7

Stating that "[e]ven before the ratification of the Constitution of the United States,
the Articles of Confederation provided that 'the people of each State shall have free ingress
and egress to and from any other state . . . .' This principle encompasses the right of
individuals 'to migrate, resettle, find a new job, and start a new life . . . . ' " 394 U.S. at 629
(quoting Articles of Confederation, Art. IV, §1 (1777).
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transfer of custody to the father in the event that the mother moved more than 50 miles
from the parties' hometown. 971 P.2d 608. When the mother sought to modify the
decree so that she could relocate, the father objected and sought custody. The trial court
awarded custody to the father. The Wyoming Supreme Court reversed the decision based
upon the mother's constitutional right to travel. Id at 612 (citing Shapiro. 395 U.S. at
629). The Wyoming Supreme Court went on to say that a citizen has the right to travel,
and this right includes the right of a custodial parent to have the children move with that
parent, and therefore, the mother was allowed to have her minor children join her in her
new community. Id. at 616.
Father's apparent argument that, under the cited statutes, the trial court could
modify the previous order to restrain Mother from ever relocating as long as the children
were minors, is without merit as such an order would clearly violate Mother's
constitutional rights under both the Utah Constitution and the Constitution of the United
States of America
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the Mother respectfully requests that this Court affirm
the lower court's denial of the Father's request to restrain the Mother from relocating to
Nevada with the children and for an award of costs pursuant to Rule 34 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure. Mother respectfully requests that this Court award her attorney's
fees and costs incurred in Father's appeal from this order, which order arose from a
hearing on the lower court's law and motion calendar.
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